IF THERE WAS A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT, HAS THE STATE PROVEN
THAT IT WAS REASONABLE?   (Continued from Page 89)  PAGES 96-152

5.    Cases dealing with some specific scenarios. (Back)

a. Presence in high crime area or drug activity. (Back)

(1) Over the years in Florida, many cases have ruled that presence in a high crime area plus fleeing does not provide reasonable suspicion. Those case have now been clearly overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. That Court has ruled that fleeing can be considered as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion. This decision may apply to other nervous behavior. Some older cases below where the application of this principle is unclear, have been left in the outline. The Supreme Court did, however, maintain the principle that presence in a high crime area alone is not sufficient for a stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed.2d 570 (2000). See also State v. O.S., 767 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

(2) Pursuant to Wardlow, the defendant’s presence in an area known for narcotics traffic combined with the defendant’s flight upon the officer’s approach was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop. McGee v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D337, 2002 WL 180317 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 6, 2002)

(3) Based on Wardlow, the court ruled that officers lawfully detained the defendant because he was with others in a high crime area known for drug activity and nervously back away from the officers. The court found that this was "unusual suspicious behavior" as in Wardlow. Copeland v. State, 756 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

(4) Court reiterated the principle that presence in a high crime area alone is insufficient for an investigatory stop and applied Wardlow to justify the conclusion that the stop was unlawful because there was no evidence of unprovoked flight. McMaster v. State, 780 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

(5) Where officers had observed many other things to indicate that drug dealing was taking place, the fact that one of the people being observed fled when officers approached was a factor that could be considered in forming reasonable suspicion. That person was not the defendant. The person fled into the woods. Officers had observed a regular pattern of individuals coming from the woods to sell drugs. State v. Gandy, 766 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

(6) The defendant was charged with a drug offense and moved to suppress the drugs. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. The trial judge found that the confidential informant was sufficiently reliable that his/her information established probable cause. On appeal, the court rejected that position; however, the court upheld the trial court’s denial on other grounds. "In summary, guided by the Supreme Court's analysis in Wardlow, we find that the aggregate of the following circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion: high crime area, recent drugs sales, a known confidential informant, the verification of information provided by the C.I., and the suspect's abbreviated attempt at flight. This case involved more than the suspect's mere presence in a high crime area and an isolated attempt to flee. The State proved that Officer Gillum reasonably and constitutionally intruded upon Mr. Mitchell's expectation of privacy when he stopped the suspect to make a brief investigation. During this legal Terry stop Mr. Mitchell's conduct gave rise to probable cause to detain him further, and the subsequent seizure of the abandoned marijuana was lawful." Mitchell v. State, 787 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

(7) The police had received numerous complaints about loiterers and trespassers at the duplex located at a specific location . Officers were dispatched in response to the complaints. The defendant and others ran from the officer. The defendant was apprehended and as a result were discovered. "On appeal Frazier argues that Officer Smith did not have a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop in this case. We disagree.... The determination of reasonable suspicion ‘must be based on common sense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’ Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). In Wardlow, the Supreme Court concluded that unprovoked flight creates an inference of wrongdoing and is among the factors to be considered in determining whether circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant an investigatory stop. Id. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (stating that headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion and is suggestive of wrongdoing). In the present case, Smith was patrolling the area at approximately 11 p.m. in response to complaints of loiterers and trespassers. When he approached the address of the complainant, he observed Frazier and others run away. Indeed, Officer Smith testified that he stopped Frazier because he believed that Frazier was trespassing. The residents' complaints, coupled with the fact that the subjects fled when the officers approached, lead us to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to justify this investigatory stop." Frazier v. State, 789 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

(8) Deputies received a prowling complaint. Deputies searched the neighborhood, but found no one. An hour and a half later they saw the defendant walking west along a road he could have reached from the area they had searched. It was 2:00 A.M. and the defendant was carrying clothes under his arm. When he saw the deputy’s car, the defendant turned and started walking away. When the deputy got out of the car and indicated that he wanted to speak to the defendant, the defendant turned around again and started walking in the opposite direction. The trial judge concluded the deputy had reasonable suspicion. Based on Wardlow and Arvizu the appellate court agreed. There is a long dissent. Sinclair v. State, 816 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

(9) A deputy was patrolling by a closed ballpark between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m.. "One of the managing authorities of the ballpark had requested the deputy’s patrol because there had been a lot of criminal mischief and burglaries at the ballpark. When the deputy arrived, he observed a car, with its lights off, parked at the dark, closed ballpark, and saw a male run from the ballpark’s field, jump in the car, and speed away. The deputy followed and stopped the car a few blocks away at a convenience store, for further investigation." As a result of the stop the deputy discovered drugs. "Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, citing Jordan v. State, 707 So.2d 338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).... The court held that the deputy did not have a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of Jordan’s truck. Id. at 339. The State argues that this case is different from Jordan, which was decided before the United States Supreme Court's decision of Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), because the defendant in Jordan did not flee at the sight of police.... Appellant argues that the facts of Jordan and this case, including unprovoked flight from the police officer, cannot be distinguished: ‘While unprovoked flight from law enforcement is a factor (and only a factor) to be considered in a "Terry stop," [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ], it is merely ambiguous...’ To the extent that Appellant’s running in unprovoked flight is ‘ambiguous,’ as argued by the Appellant, the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, are construed in a manner most favorable to upholding the trial court’s determination. State v. T.L.W., 783 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Moreover, even if Appellant’s running was ambiguous as to whether he was in flight from seeing the police, he appeared to be fleeing from something or someone. This conduct, combined with the time, place, and other circumstances justified the officer in stopping Appellant briefly to resolve this ambiguity.... We agree with Appellant that both Jordan and Appellant had parked vehicles that left at the sight of law enforcement. Jordan, 707 So.2d at 338 .... However, under Wardlow, Appellant’s leaving at the sight of law enforcement and being in a high crime area gave the officer a reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant and further investigate. In Wardlow, the Court held that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the respondent and investigate because the respondent was in a high crime area and ran in unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. 528 U.S. at 124-25, 120 S.Ct. 673." F.E.A. v. State, 804 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

(10) High drug area + late at night + unknown man appeared to be distributing items to different people + transaction with Defendant + officers followed Defendant home + when Defendant saw officers he threw object into planter + when officers passed Defendant retrieved object and placed it in his shoe. There was reasonable suspicion. State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1992).

(11) Defendant in high crime area + an anonymous tip. No reasonable suspicion. L.D.P. v. State, 551 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

(12) Defendant present in a high crime area + approaching occupant of car and extending hand. No reasonable suspicion. Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

(13) Defendant present in a high crime area + talking to occupant of vehicle + walking away upon approach of officer. No reasonable suspicion. Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

(14) Defendant present in high crime area + walking away from officer. No reasonable suspicion. Curry v. State, 570 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

(15) Defendant present with other white male in high crime area + walking away from officers + closed fist. No reasonable suspicion. J.D. v. State, 568 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

(16) Defendant present in a high crime area + recent identifiable crimes + raising entire body as if to conceal something. Reasonable suspicion. Freeman v. State, 559 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

(17) Defendant present in a high crime area + showing something to another man with a cupped hand + turning back and putting hand in groin area upon approach of an officer. Reasonable suspicion. Thornton v. State, 559 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

(18) Defendant present in a high crime area + presence with others engaged in suspicious activity. No reasonable suspicion. Ottney v. State, 571 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

(19) Defendant present in a high crime area + hand in pocket with one hand appearing bigger than the other + speaking with white male who left when officers approached. No reasonable suspicion. Stevenson v. State, 565 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

(20) Defendant present in a high crime area + defendant's presence in area on prior occasions + defendant quickly moving his hand behind him when he observed the officers. No reasonable suspicion. Smith v. State, 592 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(21) Defendant present in known drug area at 2:00 a.m. + no observation of a transaction + officer knew defendant from prior arrest. No reasonable suspicion. Grant v. State, 596 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(22) Defendant present in high crime area + walking away from officer + furtive hand movement in front of his trousers as if going for a gun. Reasonable suspicion. Wilson v. State, 569 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

(23) Presence on public street during late hours in an area where burglaries had been committed in the past + no report of recent crime. No reasonable suspicion. Randall v. State, 600 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(24) Tip from unidentified resident that drugs being sold out of an apt + complaints of drug selling out of the apt + known drug merchant came from apt and approached car + hand-to-hand exchange between the drug dealer and the driver consisting of a crumpled object in return for what looked like money + officer's experience indicated crumpled object was consistent with small doses of drugs. There was reasonable suspicion because the facts indicated that there was an exchange of what appeared to be money for an object packaged in a matter typical for contraband. State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(25) High drug area + Defendant standing in front of a house where the police had made numerous prior drug arrests + no complaints of drug-related activity there that day + Defendant talking to a man on a bike + no exchange seen + when man on bike saw the police he quickly rode away + officer saw what appeared to be cash and an object in the defendant's hand + Defendant placed a small, unknown, round object in his pocket + officer's experience indicated that a drug transaction had taken place. No reasonable suspicion. Johnson v. State, 610 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

(26) Defendant in pickup truck + near an intersection which was in a high crime area + man approached the vehicle and appeared to pass something to the occupants + officer saw arm movement but could not identify any objects. No reasonable suspicion. Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(27) Early morning hour + high drug activity + another individual was looking and pointing his index finger into the defendant's outstretched palm. Reasonable suspicion. Borgis v. State, 590 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

(28) Early morning hours + pickup truck with lights out, parked off the street + in or near the property of a known drug dealer + three unknown men were standing next to the truck on the passenger's side + as officers approached nearer the truck the three men left the area and the defendant rapidly drove the pickup away + officers never saw anything exchange hands. No reasonable suspicion. The Court distinguished this case from State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1992). There the officer observed furtive movements involving the exchange of "'items'". That was not the case here. Hewlett v. State, 599 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(29) "We conclude that the multiple attempts to flag down traffic by these pedestrians, over a period of ten to twenty minutes, gave the officers, who knew from their experience that this is how drugs are sold on the street, founded suspicion to temporarily detain appellant." The court relied on the fact that in Terry the Court found that there was a lawful stop where "an officer observed three men on foot walking back and forth in front of a particular store, in the afternoon, peering in the window of the store, and the conversing with each other." McCloud v. State, 717 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

(30) Defendant a passenger in a car + in an area where burglaries frequently occurred. No reasonable suspicion. Silverman v. State, 610 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

(31) Officers in area known for narcotics transactions + a car pulled into a parking lot + three males exited the vehicle and met a fourth person + one officer recognized two of the three men who got out of the car, but he did not say how he knew them + the four men huddled for a short time + the fourth man opened his hand, palm up, and appeared to be showing the contents of his palms to the others + the men separated + the three men got back into the car and left + the fourth walked away + no testimony that an exchange had occurred. The car was stopped. The Court found no reasonable suspicion. In that regard the Court found it significant that the officers did not observe any exchange. "We are not suggesting that an exchange of money or contraband must be observed before a permissible stop may be made. Rather the lack of such a transaction is cited as demonstrative of the paucity or factual circumstances objectively demonstrating past, present or impending future criminal activity in the case before us. While it is true that the police ... have testified that the conduct they observed was consistent with drug transactions, a stop nevertheless must be based 'on objective facts.'" Furthermore, in this case none of the men who were observed made any "furtive, suspicious or potentially dangerous movement, nor were they observed to be engaged in anything other than seemingly innocent behavior, albeit in a high crime area. It is well-established that such behavior, which may be suspicious but not demonstrably or conceivably criminal, is not sufficient to establish a founded suspicion, even in a high crime area." The opinion contains an excellent list of cases illustrating these points. Hills v. State, 629 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). See also State v. Gandy, 766 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(observation of exchange not required).

(32) Driving aimlessly in a high crime area + behaving nervously after a stop for having an open container. No reasonable suspicion. Sims v. State, 622 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

(33) Defendant in high drug area + other individuals present in the street + car approached flipping headlights on and off + defendant walked up to passenger door and leaned inside + when officer approached, defendant stood up, became nervous and tried to leave. No reasonable suspicion because the officer did not see money or drugs transferred. M.J.S. v. State, 624 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

(34) Defendant in high crime area + legally parked in a lot + defendant mumbled, fidgeted, avoided eye contact. No reasonable suspicion. Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

(35) Defendant in high crime area + use of handshake commonly used to exchange money or drugs + officer did not actually see any money or drugs. No reasonable suspicion. "The State relies on State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1992).... However, in Anderson, a founded suspicion existed because the officers had observed the man, with whom Anderson conducted business, engaged in similar transactions; the transactions occurred in the late evening hours; and the officers saw Anderson's furtive suspicious actions upon the approach of the police car." Based on the officer's experience the totality of the circumstances justified the stop in that case. The situation was different here. Walker v. State, 625 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

(36) Defendant in high crime area + running several city blocks + carrying three large shopping bags + looking back over shoulder + stores in immediate area had closed. There was reasonable suspicion. State v. Abraham, 625 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

(37) Defendant in high crime area + walking towards officers with hands in pocket. No reasonable suspicion. Palmer v. State, 625 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

(38) Defendant in high drug area + talking to officer + another officer made eye contact + defendant turned back, crouched down and put something in his mouth. Putting something in the mouth did not establish reasonable suspicion. A.C. v. State, 630 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

(39) Defendant in a high drug area at 9:00 p.m.+ in alleyway leading into a parking lot + defendant and others making exchanges and talking + when men saw officers they all ran + 10 to 20 minutes later the officers saw defendant again next to a car + defendant had bulge under his shirt + defendant removed something from under his shirt, leaned down behind the driver's door, and placed the object in the car. Based on standards set forth in State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1992), the officers had reasonable suspicion. State v. Newsome, 638 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

(40) Defendant in high drug area + Defendant passenger in car driving slowly through area + Car stopped in middle of road + transaction took place + officer saw exchange of money for something. There was reasonable suspicion. State v. Saums, 633 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

(41) Defendant observed in high crime area + several males were around his vehicle + officer did not see any exchange + officer did not recognize any of the people. No reasonable suspicion. State v. Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

(42) Defendant in an area known for drug activity + when he saw officers he began pedaling bike in the opposite direction. No reasonable suspicion. Cowart v. State, 635 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

(43) Officer was an experienced narcotics officer + defendant in high drug area + officer saw defendant participate in two exchanges + officer had seen several exchanges there one week before + there had been complaints of drug dealing + officer recognized activity as typical of drug deal + man took something from pocket and gave it to defendant + defendant gave the man cash + defendant wrapped cash around what man gave him + the defendant did the same type of thing with a woman. There was reasonable suspicion. The exchange of money for an object was particularly persuasive. Walker v. State, 636 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

(44) Defendant stopped vehicle near trailer where drugs were sold + passenger entered trailer + passenger returned to vehicle in a few minutes. No reasonable suspicion. Powell v. State, 649 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(45) Officers observed the defendant approach a man and hand him money in exchange for a substance that the officers believed might be drugs. Given the totality of the circumstances the officers had a founded suspicion to make an investigatory stop. Ramirez v. State, 654 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(46) Officers were watching a house at a location where the police had made thirty or forty arrests. A dealer, who worked that location, was personally known to one of the officers. At about 10:45 p.m. an officer saw the defendant pull up in a car. The known dealer came out of the house, and the officer who knew the dealer, saw the defendant and the dealer engage in a "hand-to-hand" transaction. The officer did not see any money or drugs exchange hands. The observing officer radioed to others who stopped the car in which the defendant was located and found cocaine. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant even though no officer saw any money or drugs before the stop. Although the court is reluctant to permit a stop where there is not observation of money or drugs, other factors justifying the stop in this case. "Of significance are the officer's narcotics experience; the reputation of the location for drive-up transaction; the extended period of surveillance; and the history of previous multiple arrests from that site. In this case, all of these factors, together with the nature of the exchange between Burnette and a known dealer gave rise to a reasonable suspicion in Officer Griffis that [the defendant] had engaged in illegal activity." Nevertheless, the cause was remanded for further proceedings because there was no evidence as to any additional factors which would have been sufficient to create probable cause for the search of the car. Burnette v. State, 658 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(47) On appeal the court found that the officer had a founded suspicion of criminal activity justifying an investigatory stop based on the following facts: (1) officers were conducting surveillance of a certain house; (2) it was in an area known for drug activity; (3) one of the officers had the place under surveillance three times a week for a month; (4) during this time cars would come up to the house, either along the street or in the driveway; (5) black males would come out and approach the drivers or the drivers would get out of the vehicle; (6) items would be handed back and forth and then the vehicle would leave; (7) three or four arrests were made after seeing these things and the arrestees were found with cocaine in their possession; (8) on the night in question one of the officers saw a red Ford escort pull into the driveway; (9) several black males came out of the house and approached the car; (10) the defendant got out of the front passenger side of the car and walked toward the front of the car; (11) the defendant and one of the black males were engaged in conversation; (12) the black male cupped his hand and held it out to the defendant; (13) the defendant looked down into the hand and then began reaching into his front right pocket; (14) both the defendant and the other person walked closer to the house and behind another car parked in the driveway; (15) after being behind the car for a few seconds, the defendant turned around and quickly walked back to his car; (16) the car then backed out and drove away. The officers saw no money or drugs exchanged. Saadi v. State, 658 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). See also State v. Gandy, 766 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

(48) An officer first saw the defendant, a young black male, at 8:30 p.m. in a vehicle in the area of a motel that officers had under surveillance for suspected drug activity. An officer determined that the owner of the vehicle was a white female in her 40's. The officer saw the defendant about 30 minutes later and attempted to make a traffic stop. Before the stop was made the officer saw the defendant make an abrupt left turn into the motel with out giving a proper signal. When the stop was made, the officer found that the defendant was driving with a suspended license and arrested him. A search of the vehicle incident to the arrest revealed cocaine. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. When the officer was asked if he stopped the defendant because of the traffic infraction or had he already made up his mind to stop the defendant before the infraction, the officer responded that he stopped the defendant because of "'[a] combination of events. The, um, suspected confirmed drug activity; the fact that, um, he came out of that area; he was driving a car that was not registered to him.'" On appeal the court reversed. "Mere presence in a high crime area is not sufficient to provide the founded suspicion of prior, present, or imminent criminal activity necessary to support a stop. Mosley v. State, 519 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Particularly insufficient and abhorrent as a purported basis for founded suspicion is the bare fact of a young black male driving a vehicle registered to a white female older than he." McCray v. State, 657 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(49) The fact that between 6:30 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. the officer saw the defendant pushing a shopping cart containing a television around a "high crime" area did not establish a reasonable suspicion. Mayhue v. State, 659 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(50) "The court found that there was reasonable suspicion based on these facts: "[The defendant] was seen in a known narcotics area at night. He stopped his car in the middle of the street where he was approached by two individuals. These two individuals conversed with [him] at his car window; at which time an exchange was observed. [The defendant] then drove away and the other two walked backed onto a side yard." "We recognize that there are numerous cases holding that mere presence in a high crime area coupled with furtive movement does not justify a stop. [citations omitted] Here, however, the totality of the circumstances is sufficiently indicative of the modus operandi of narcotics dealers and purchasers to justify the stop." Brandin v. State, 669 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

(51) In the late afternoon the defendant was in a high crime area sitting on a bicycle with a very small plastic baggie in his hand. When two officers approached him from behind, the defendant shoved the baggie down the front of his pants. Based on that the officers grabbed the defendant. As that happened the defendant dropped two baggies on the ground. The officers picked them up and determined that they contained rock cocaine. The officer knew nothing about the defendant and had never seen him before. He saw the baggie for only two or three seconds before the defendant stuffed it into his pants. The defendant was arrested. The defendant's motion to suppress was denied. On appeal the court reversed. The officers did not have reasonable suspicion justifying a detention. "[N]either the mere sight of a baggie, nor the concealment thereof, established a well-founded suspicion to seize or detain [the defendant]. The fact that one of the officers equivocally stated he saw something in the baggie, without more, does not change the situation." Welch v. State, 689 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

(52) An officer saw the defendant in a high crime area at 10:45 p.m.. The defendant had been standing next to a male, who was talking on a pay phone. The defendant began to walk away and the officer followed him in an unmarked car. The officer asked if he would stop. The defendant said he did not know the officer and continued to walk. As the officer exited, the defendant ran. The officer chased the defendant and detained him. The officer testified that he did this because he believed the defendant had been loitering and prowling and he also believed that the defendant was going to try to sell drugs to the person seen talking on the phone. A motion to suppress was denied. On appeal the court reversed because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop nor were there grounds to arrest the defendant for loitering and prowling. "Standing or walking in a high crime area does not by itself, create a reasonable concern for the safety of persons or property." Coleman v. State, 707 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

(53) An officer saw the defendant approach three individuals in an area known for high drug activity. The defendant was riding a bike in circles on a street corner next to a drug store. The officer watched the defendant talk with three individuals. They kept walking as if they did not want to talk with the defendant. When the officer approached the group, the defendant left. The officer asked the three members of the group what the defendant had asked them. They replied that the defendant asked them if they wanted "something." Based on these facts the officer stopped the defendant and asked him his name. When the officer determined that the defendant had given a false name, he arrested the defendant for resisting without violence. A search incidental to that arrest revealed cocaine. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court reversed. "The facts present in the instant case do not establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. There was nothing exchanged and the conduct was essentially innocent." p. 894. Wilson v. State, 707 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

(54) A deputy saw the defendant in a truck parked late at night in front of a closed business that had been burglarized in the past. When the deputy turned around to go back to the truck, the defendant pulled away. The deputy noticed that the defendant had "'all kinds of stuff'" in the back of the truck. The deputy stopped the defendant. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. On appeal the court ruled that the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop. Jordan v. State, 707 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

(55) Driving slowly late at night in a type of vehicle that is often stolen and in a neighborhood that has had burglaries at some unspecified time in the past did not provide a founded suspicion for an investigatory stop. Love v. State, 706 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

b. Fleeing or evasive action: C.D.M. v. State, 553 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Mack v. State, 557 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Prokop v. State, 559 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).  (Back)

(1) Flight + knowledge of officer's intent to detain. No reasonable suspicion. F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). [Probably overruled by Wardlow].

(2) Flight alone does not constitute obstructing. J.A. v. State, 679 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

(3) Flight alone does not establish a well founded suspicion. D.M. v. State, 681 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

(4) "[B]ecause the initial interaction between the officers and appellant was a consensual encounter, appellant was free to ignore the officers and walk away from them.... Appellant did, in fact, exercise his right to ignore Officer Zenelovic's questions about his identity. He also started to walk away, and then ran as the officers began questioning him about the beer can he was holding Without question, when the officers gave chase and subdued appellant, the encounter ceased being consensual and progressed to a stop or ‘seizure.’... For such conduct to be lawful, the officers must have a reasonable suspicion, and such suspicion must be supported by articulable facts.... Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that unprovoked flight from the police in a high crime neighborhood can provide sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).... The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Wardlow. Here, there was not the same sort of sudden, unprovoked, and headlong flight in a high crime area as there was in Wardlow. Appellant was not in a location identified by the officers as a high crime area. Moreover, appellant did not flee right away upon discovering the police officers' presence in the vicinity. In contrast to the defendant in Wardlow, appellant stopped when approached by the officers and engaged in a brief verbal exchange with them. During this exchange, appellant pointedly questioned Officer Zenelovic’s motives in asking about his identity and communicated his unwillingness to cooperate with them. Wardlow acknowledged that Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), gives an individual the right to ignore the police and go about his business and that "[a]ny ‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.’" Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389). Hence, we do not think that the circumstances in this case constitute the kind of ‘unprovoked flight’ contemplated in Wardlow." Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

(5) "Defendant’s attempt to leave the area when he saw the police officer was not, by itself, enough to create a reasonable suspicion. See Cobb v. State, 511 So.2d 698, 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). However, flight can be considered when there are other suspicious circumstances. Thus: ‘It is commonly held that flight at the sight of an approaching police officer is a suspicious circumstance which, when added to other suspicious circumstances, may justify the belief that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity and, therefore, an investigatory stop. (citations omitted)’ In light of the already suspicious circumstances in this case, the attempt by defendant and his companions to walk away may be considered in deciding whether there was a reasonable suspicion. Drivers of motor vehicles do not normally walk away, leaving the doors open and, as to the red van, the vehicle protruding into the traffic area, as defendant and his companions did in this case." Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

c. Tips: Mitchell v. State, 558 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); State v. Barcenas, 559 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Strebel v. State, 573 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Swanson v. State, 591 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Brown v. State, 592 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Sapp v. State, 592 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Whiting v. State, 595 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); State v. Cash, 595 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); State v. Diaz, 595 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Simpkins v. State, 613 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). (Back)

(1) For standards that apply to an anonymous tip as a basis for reasonable suspicion see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

(2) White requires corroboration by officers of prediction of activity to come after the tip. Not merely corroboration "of easily obtained facts and conditions presumably existing at the time of the informant's call." Swanson v. State, 591 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also Davis v. State, 606 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

(3) An anonymous tip reported that several young black men were standing at a specified bus stop during the day. The tip stated that one of the men was wearing a "plaid-looking" shirt and that person was carrying a gun. Two officers arrived at the scene about six minutes after receiving the tip and saw three black males, one of who was wearing a plaid shirt. "The three males were engaged in no suspicious or illegal conduct and no additional suspicious circumstances were observed by the officers." An officer frisked the defendant and discovered a gun. At the same time, another officer frisked the other individuals. The trial judge granted a motion to suppress. The district court reversed and ruled that the circumstances indicated that the tip was reliable. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the third district. The Court identified these basic rules concerning reliance on tips: (1) "Anonymous tips are generally less reliable than tips provided by known informants who have previously provided information." (2) "Tips from known reliable informants, such as an identifiable citizen who observes criminal conduct and reports it, along with his own identity to the police, will almost invariably be found sufficient to justify police action." (3) "[A]nonymous tips must be closely scrutinized." (4) "A tip’s reliability can be established in a number of different ways." (5) "A tip may describe suspicious details concerning conduct that is presently occurring or is about to occur in the future (i.e., a call received after midnight, on a warm summer evening, stating, ‘A person is carrying a gun; that person is wearing a ski mask and a long trench coat and is approaching a convenience store.’). Verification by the police of the suspicious details clearly provides the police with the requisite reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop." (6) "Innocent detail tips merely provide the police with verifiable details which are completely innocent in nature (i.e., a tip ..., which only describes innocuous clothing, location, etc.). Such "tips can still prove to be reliable and be the foundation for reasonable suspicion. For instance, a tip can predict particular actions which will occur in the future. Future predictions can establish that the tip is reliable if the tip ‘contains[s] a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.’ (citations omitted) ‘[I]ndependent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions [can] impart[] some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.’" (7) "Reasonable suspicion can be established by verification of a presently-occurring innocent detail tip coupled with an independent police investigation. (citation omitted) But for these types of tips (presently-occurring innocent detail tips), the independent police investigation would have to uncover something more than just a verification of the innocent details. The police must observe additional suspicious circumstances as a result of the independent investigation." The Court concluded that the reliability of the tip in the case at bar was not established through any of these methods. J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1998), affirmed, 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000); Woodson v. State, 747 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Johnson v. State, 741 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Travers v. State, 739 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

(4) "The tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White and essential to the Court's decision in that case. The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility.... Florida contends that the tip was reliable because its description of the suspect's visible attributes proved accurate: ... These contentions misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed.2d 254 (2000).

(5) "A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as amicus is, in essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a ‘firearm exception.’ Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position. Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions.... But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far. Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed.2d 254 (2000).

(6) "[T]here must be independent evidence of criminal activity apart from the otherwise verified anonymous tip to support a search of the described suspect." Miller v. State, 613 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

(7) (1) An investigatory stop may be based on such information if it "'appears sufficiently reliable because of the surrounding circumstances or the nature of the information given in the tip itself.'" (2) "The information may be of such detail that it raises an inference of reliability." (3) "The degree to which those details are corroborated by police observation may justify an investigatory detention." C.F. v. State, 603 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

(8) A complaint by a woman that a man parked near her had been harassing her and was scaring her was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Ramos, 598 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

(9) "As in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the information provided by the anonymous informant included easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time the information was relayed as well as predictions of Miller's future activities. It is this latter type of information and its corroboration by law enforcement that the Supreme Court found critically important to heightening the reliability of an anonymous informant's tip to the level at which it could be acted upon." State v. Miller, 606 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(10) Tip provided by an identified store clerk. The defendant argued that the initial detention was unlawful because the information provided by the store clerk was not corroborated. On appeal the Court disagreed. "While corroboration would have been required had the clerk been an anonymous informant, she was not anonymous, and it was reasonable for the officers to believe that an emergency existed because of the dispatch pursuant to a 911 call and because of the clerk's demeanor upon their arrival at a type of establishment targeted for robberies." State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

(11) A deputy received information from an informant known to him, but of unknown reliability. The informant gave the deputy the following information: (1) marijuana was to be transported from a house at a certain address; (2) a physical description of the house and two cars that would be parked in front of the house; (3) a white male named Mac Evans would leave the house in about 30 minutes with at least a quarter pound of marijuana; (4) the man would be transporting the drugs to the vicinity of Naples in one of the cars. Based on this information a second deputy went to the address. He confirmed that there was a house and two cars matching the description given by the informant at the address. A few minutes later, he saw a white male and a woman come out of the house and get into one of the cars. The man was carrying an unidentified package. The deputy followed the car until it entered the interstate going towards Naples. The deputies made a Terry stop. The woman was driving, was the registered owner of the car, and consented to a search of the car, which revealed drugs. The trial court suppressed the evidence based on the decision in United States v. Solomon, 728 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1990). On appeal the Court reversed based on the following conclusions: (1) The Solomon case involved an arrest and not a Terry stop and the arrest was based on an anonymous tip that predicted transportation of drugs. (2) In Solomon only "innocent factual information from the tipster was corroborated before the arrest." (3) In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the Court "recognized that detailed factual information from an anonymous tipster may be insufficient to permit a Terry stop if that information is easily obtained and is not itself incriminating." (4) The Court in White also ruled "that the police could temporarily detain the occupants of a car if the police corroborated an anonymous tipster's prediction of future behavior which indicated that the informant had inside information." (5) The White decision supports the validity of the stop in this case. (6) While the information here was less detailed than provided in other cases that problem was cured because the informant was known to the officer and he could be located and account for any false information. (6) "For purposes of a Terry stop, any slight weakness in the factual information provided in this case or in the predicted behavior is overcome by the fact that the information was provided by an informant whose identity was known and who provided the information in person." State v. Evans, 620 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

(12) The stop of the defendant's vehicle was upheld and the trial judge's order granting a motion to suppress a confession was reversed. "The information provided by an anonymous caller, which included details of identification and a prediction as to meaningful future behavior through information that could only have come from a special familiarity with the suspect's affairs, was corroborated by the officer's independent observations and was sufficient to meet the standard of reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of both vehicles." The information provided by an informant was that between 9 and 10 A.M. December 3 Prince Adderly and Yolanda Tenie would leave their house in a blue and white Cadillac to transport and sell drugs. The tip provided the address of the couple's residence, the tag number of the car, and the address of the building to which the drugs were being transported. After verifying the information officers conducted surveillance at the house at the time the tip indicated. A few minutes after 9 A.M. the defendant drove up, walked to the back of the house where he stayed for just two minutes, and then returned to his car and sat for thirty minutes. When he drove away the vehicle was stopped. State v. Hanna, 622 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

(13) An officer received a call from a C.I. He had worked with the informant for six months and the informant had provided reliable information at least 25 times which led to several arrests. The informant provided the following information: the name of the person driving the involved car; that there was a passenger; a description of the car, including the make, color, year, tag number; and the fact that the tag light was inoperable. The informant also told the officer that the suspects would have drugs which they picked up in a certain town and they would be heading to another town on route 540A. Within an hour the officer checked the license number and the driver's residence to be sure that the car was not at the home. The officers then positioned themselves alone the route. Within minutes they spotted the car and stopped it. The information given by the informant matched. This was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. State v. Hadden, 629 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

(14) A juvenile told an officer that a woman passenger in a car parked nearby had asked him for crack cocaine. The officer had no prior dealings with the juvenile. When the officer approached the car he found it exactly as the juvenile had described it. There were two females in the car. When the officer asked the driver for her license. He noticed that the defendant, who was one of the women, closed her legs together as if to hide something. The officer did not believe that the defendant had a weapon, but he asked her to exit the vehicle. A subsequent search revealed a crack cocaine pipe. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the detention. Cronin v. State, 656 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

(15) The fact that tipster contacted the police three times didn't make the tip sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. "An anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop if independent police investigation corroborates the anonymous information." In this case the tip was insufficient and the court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. The tip described a black male including height, weight, and clothing. The tipster said that the man was packaging cocaine in an apartment at a certain location and that he wold be driving a green Toyota vehicle. In the next two contacts the tipster just said that the car was still there and that the car was leaving. The officers never corroborated the information but stopped the car which the defendant was driving. They did not see the defendant leave the apartment or get into the car. Nor did they see if he was carrying anything. In fact once they stopped the defendant, there were "innocent details of the tip that they could not corroborate." The defendant's height, weight and clothing did not match the description. The car the defendant was driving was a Mazda not a Toyota. The only information the police were able to corroborate was that the defendant was a black man driving a green car. Fuller v. State, 658 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(16) A deputy received a radio dispatch directing him to a "possible" drug transaction. It allegedly involved four people at an apartment or home with two white vehicles in front of its door and across the street from a Cuban market on a specified avenue. The deputy went to the location and found two white cars parked in front. The defendant was one of the people who came from the residence. The officer became concerned for his safety and detained the defendant. A search of his person resulted in the discovery of drugs. A motion to suppress was denied. On appeal the court reversed. The information received by the officer was inadequate to establish reasonable suspicion. "In addition to the fact that the dispatch only relayed that a possible drug transaction was occurring involving possibly four individuals, no descriptions were provided of the individuals or the residence involved, no license tag numbers were given and there was no indication that the source of the information had seen a drug transaction, drugs, or money. The minimal general facts given 'could have been provided by any pilgrim on the roadway.'" There was no corroboration. Chase v. State, 656 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(17) An officer knew the area where he was assigned was a high crime area for drugs. He new that the typical drug transaction involved a person, usually white, driving a car down the street until a black male or a group of black males approached the car. The driver would stop the car, and the black males would run over to the car window. The drug seller showed his product, the buyer showed his money, and they made the exchange. The officer received a dispatch that an anonymous caller had reported that a white male and a white female had knocked on the caller's door and asked to purchase drugs. The caller said those people got into a gray, mid-seized four-door vehicle. The officer was a block and a half away. He immediately went to the location named by the caller. He saw the car described by the caller in that location. A white female and a white male was it. A black male approached the car and stuck his hand into the driver's side window. The white female was leaning forward and looking down at the black male's hand. When the black male saw the officer, he immediately removed his hand and walked away. The car left. The car was stopped based on the officer's belief that he had seen a drug transaction. The trial judge granted a motion to suppress. The court reversed. "An anonymous tip may provide the basis for a valid stop if the information has a certain degree of reliability. Hetland v. State, 387 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1980). In evaluating an anonymous tip we must look to the specificity of the information provided and the officer's corroboration of the information.... [In this case] [t]he anonymous tip was vague as to the description of the car; however, a car meeting that description was in the exact place ... at the exact time. The description of the occupants of the vehicle also was vague, but [the two people in the car] fit that description." There must also be corroboration of the tip that the white female and the white male were trying to buy drugs. Although, the officers observations standing alone would not have been sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, they were sufficient, combined with the officers knowledge, to provide that corroboration. "[The officer] received an anonymous tip which was vague, but he observed a vehicle meeting that description within minutes of the call in the exact place where the caller indicated. Then [the officer] observed suspicious behavior which, based on his four years' experience in that area, led him to the reasonable belief that a drug transaction had occurred. Thus, [the officer] had a founded suspicion to stop the vehicle." State v. Santiago, 657 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(18) "'[T]he veracity of citizen-informants need not be substantiated.'" In this case a homeowner heard a noise, looked out the window, and saw someone at the rear of one of the houses across the canal. The homeowner observed several other things which created a reasonable suspicion and called the sheriff. This tip did not need to be corroborated. Persaud v. State, 659 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

(19) The manager of a restaurant made a 911 call stating that a person in the drive-through looked "wasted," drunk, and was incoherent. An officer arrived. He waited for the vehicle to pull into the street and then pulled the defendant over. The trial judge granted a motion to suppress because the tip was not properly corroborated. On appeal the court reversed. The court recognized that an anonymous tip requires corroboration. In this case, however, the manager of the restaurant had provided identifying information and her identity was readily ascertainable. Furthermore, the manager was a "citizen-informant." These are unrelated third persons who are victims or witnesses and whose identity is known to officers or readily ascertainable. The reliability of such an informant is greater and corroboration is not required. State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

(20) The ruling in State v. Evans was followed in another case where a 14 year old boy told officers that they saw a man with a gun go into a convenience store. The officers did not know the boys name, but they recognized him as a resident of the area. On appeal the court found that the boy was a citizen-informant and his statements provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. Aguilar v. State, 700 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

(21) The ruling in Evans was followed in another case where a security guard at a gate to an apartment complex advised the deputy entering the complex that the vehicle in front of him smelled like marijuana. "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence views the security guard tipster as a highly reliable ‘citizen informant’ for two reasons: 1) her identification was readily ascertainable, and 2) she was motivated not by pecuniary gain, but by a desire to further justice, as a matter of civic duty. See State v. Manuel, 796 So.2d 602, 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). With the quality of information provided here, Deputy Vazquez was not required to corroborate the information before conducting an investigatory stop." State v. K.V., 2002 WL 1332506 (Fla. 4th DCA June 19, 2002).

(22) The officer was advised by a dispatcher that an unknown female had called and identified herself as the defendant’s mother. She stated that her son had just left her and he was intoxicated. She gave specific descriptions of her son and the car and the direction in which she believed her son was driving. Shortly after receiving the information, the officer saw a car matching the descriptions and in the location given by the caller. The officer stopped the defendant and identified the defendant as the driver. A search of the vehicle revealed drugs. The defendant argued that the officer did not have probable cause for the stop because the stop was based on an anonymous tip. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court affirmed. The court found that the appropriate standard was reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. "[A]lthough the caller was a previously unknown female, the court finds that the tip was not anonymous because the caller identified herself as the mother of the person about whom she was calling." Thus, the court found that she was a citizen informant and, for that reason, her information was at the high end of the reliability scale. The court found that the information had sufficient indicia of reliability because the woman identified herself and the information was specific. The officer was also able to verify some things through personal observation prior to the search. He saw a beer can and a knife in plain view in the vehicle and detected an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant. These observations, along with the information from the mother, gave him probable cause to search the vehicle. Foy v. State, 717 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

(23) At about 4:00 a.m. the dispatcher advised a deputy that a citizen just called 911 from Sylvia Lane and reported seeing a large, dark, older model four-door sedan driving up and down that road with its lights off. The deputy knew that burglaries had been reported on that same street six to twelve hours earlier. The deputy did not testify as to the identity of the citizen informant, but the deputy did say that the informant knew about the burglaries. The defense attorney acknowledged that the informant was a victim of one of the burglaries. The deputy went quickly to the area. He saw a large, brown, sedan, with lights on, turning from Sylvia Lane onto North Boulevard. The deputy saw no other traffic on the streets at that time. The deputy started to follow the vehicle. He saw, the driver look at him, turn away, and look back in his mirror at the deputy. The deputy stopped the vehicle and saw various items of property. The victim arrived and identified the property. The deputy arrested the driver. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal, in a two to one decision, the court affirmed because the court found that the deputy had reasonable suspicion. The totality of the circumstances must be considered. "Factors that may be considered include: the time of day; the appearance and behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; and anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge." The officer was entitled to presume that the information was reliable because it came from a citizen informant. Grant v. State, 718 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

(24) An anonymous tip can be the basis for an investigatory stop. In this case, the informant called and gave very little information. There was an absence of independent police corroboration. Thus, the stop was unlawful. The State argued that the stop was valid because the information came from a citizen informant; therefore, the information was at the high of the scale of reliability. On appeal the court held that if the informant had been a citizen informant the tip would have been sufficient. This person was not a citizen informant. The person called in, but gave no information that would permit law enforcement to contact the person. The court held that it is not necessary for an individual to actually identify himself or herself in order to be considered a citizen informant, but there must be some way to identify the person. The court pointed out that in State v. Gonzalez, 682 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the informant called in on 911 and most people know that such calls are taped and traceable and it was clear that the caller was a neighbor of the home that was being burglarized. Thus, the person was considered a citizen informant. In another case, a neighborhood boy gave the information. Although police did not know the child’s name, they could easily have located him. Furthermore, the child personally approached the officers and surely knew that he could be instructed to remain at the scene and listed as a witness. Clearly, a citizen informant is distinguished from other informant’s by virtue of being exposed to accountability. R.A. v. State, 723 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

(25) A truck driver approached deputies at a rest stop. He exited his vehicle and told the deputies, "that he had seen a white Firebird driving down the road, that the car had been weaving on the road, and that he felt the driver was impaired." The driver also gave the deputies the tag number of the firebird and then left the rest stop. "The deputies did not know this informant, did not get his identity or identify the semi he was operating." As the truck was leaving, a white Firebird came through the rest stop and was headed for the exit. The deputies detained the vehicle. "The deputies testified that they saw nothing illegal or improper about the operation of the Firebird, could not tell if it had stopped at the rest stop or was merely rolling through, and stopped it solely because of the truck driver’s tip. When they checked the tag number, it matched that given by the truck driver." As a result of this stop contraband was seen in the car. It was seized. The trial judge suppressed the evidence on the grounds that the stop was illegal. On appeal the court affirmed. The court found that the truck driver was an anonymous tipster. "His identify is unknown, any means of locating him is unknown, as are his motives for disclosing the information. He might have pointed out the Firebird because he was angered by its driver, might have been cut off by the driver or been the recipient of an obscene gesture, or for any reason other than the one he gave deputies. The deputies had no way to corroborate the information, and agreed at the hearing that they had not themselves seen anything that would have given them reason to stop the Firebird other than the tip." The court noted that in State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the court said that not all tips are of equal value. "‘[A]nonymous tips are at the low end of the reliability scale.’" They must contain detailed and specific information which the police corroborate. In Evans the informants were classified as "citizen informants" whose information could be considered reliable. They "clearly identified themselves, gave detailed information on the alleged violation and their motives for disclosing the information were readily ascertainable." In contrast, in this case the sole basis for concluding the driver was impaired was the conclusory tip of the unknown person. State v. Rewis, 722 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

(26) A citizen reported to police that shortly before the subsequent stop, three males had driven by him in a dark sedan, leaned out the window, yelled, brandished baseball bats and a gun at him, and then headed north. The officer put out a BOLO with this information. Almost immediately another officer reported that she had stopped a similar group of men in a similar vehicle three or four blocks north of the scene of the incident. As a result of that stop evidence was discovered. The trial judge suppressed the evidence because the initial stop was not based on a founded suspicion of criminal activity. On appeal the court reversed. "In the light of (a) the source and presumed reliability of the information provided by the victim and contained in the BOLO, Lachs v. State, 366 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) and the consistency of the circumstances of the stop with (b) the description of the car and its occupants and (c) the time and place of the offense, it is clear that there was a 'rational basis for the conclusion that those who were riding in the vehicle and those described in the BOLO were [three] and the same.'" Thus the stop was lawful. State v. Reyes, 680 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

(27) The court reversed the order suppressing evidence secured as a result of an investigatory stop. "‘[The officer] received a call dispatching him to the bank because a 6–foot tall black male was attempting to pass a forged check. The crime was reported by a bank employee, and therefore the information was more reliable than if reported by an anonymous tipster (citation omitted). [The officer] arrived five minutes later, which would have given the suspect time to get outside. He observed a black male who generally matched the description fitting the description sitting in a parked Blazer. The Blazer was backed into a parking space directly in front of the bank’s doors. One committing a crime might park their vehicle in this manner to facilitate a quick get-away. (citation omitted) When the man in the Blazer saw the officer drive up, he put the Blazer in gear and pulled away in a hurry. (citations omitted) There were not many cars in the parking lot, no other people were in the parking lot, and no one else was leaving at that time. These are articulable facts which caused the officer to reasonably suspect that [the defendant] had tried to pass a bad check at the bank." Thus, the stop was lawful. State v. Malone, 729 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

(28) An off duty officer observed the defendant driving erratically. He followed the defendant and observed more erratic driving. The officer called 911 from his cell phone and identified himself as an off duty officer. He reported what he had observed and gave a description of his car and the defendant’s car. The off duty officer remained on the phone with dispatch until the police arrived and confirmed that the police were following the right car. The court ruled that the off duty officer was a citizen informant and the information he provided could be properly considered in forming reasonable suspicion. Ellis v. State, 755 So. 2d 767 (Fla.4th DCA 2000).

(29) There has been some conflict among the districts concerning citizen informants. The Supreme Court has resolved this conflict. The Court adopted the standards set forth in State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), for determining whether a person is a citizen-informant. There the court identified four factors the court should consider. First, the person provided information to law enforcement as to his or her identification. In Evans, that included her name, location, and occupation. Second, the police could readily ascertain the informant’s identity. This is the critical factor. Even if the informant’s identity is not made known, if it is readily ascertainable, that person will qualify as a citizen-informant. The third factor is that the informant is not motived by the desire for "‘pecuniary gain, but by the desire to further justice.’" (quoting from Evans). Finally, rather than being a person who is involved in the criminal enterprise, the citizen-informant is usually an "‘average citizen who by happenstance finds himself in the position of a victim of or a witness to criminal conduct and thereafter relates to the police what he knows as a matter of civic duty.’" (quoting from Evans). The Supreme Court applied these standards to justify the conclusion that the informant the case before the Court was a citizen informant. She identified herself as the mother of the individual who she was calling about and she gave her address. "Even though it is not clear whether the caller gave the police her actual name, the fact that she disclosed her address made her identity easily ascertainable." The only identifiable motive for the call was "concern for the safety of her son and others." State v. Maynard, 783 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2001).

(30) A woman who told an officer that three men just ran out of a department store carrying a duffle bag full of clothes, went outside with the officer and pointed out the defendant and his car, was a citizen-informant even though the officer did not get her name. Carrattini v. State, 774 So.2d 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

(31) "Appellant was stopped and searched by a detective acting on information given to him by the victim of an alleged assault with a firearm. The information from this witness consisted of a physical description of the alleged perpetrator and the location where the incident took place. The witness did not identify himself nor was the witness known to the detective" An officer went to the location and made observations that were consistent with the informant’s information. "Appellant argues that the information given to the detective was by an individual not known to him and should have been classified as an anonymous tip for which additional independent corroboration was needed to justify a stop of appellant. .. We find that the information given to the detective in person by this unidentified witness was sufficiently reliable, based on the surrounding circumstances and the nature of the tip itself, to create a founded suspicion by the detective to conduct an investigatory stop of appellant. The record shows that the witness provided the detective with a physical description of the perpetrator that closely matched that of appellant. The detective also found appellant in the same location described by the witness. The witness provided the detective with information ‘face to face,’ then remained on the scene to identify the appellant. A witness who provides information to a police officer through ‘face to face’ communication is deemed to be sufficiently reliable. See Carattini v. State, 774 So.2d 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). This court also stated in Aguilar that, if a witness's identity is readily discoverable, then the information given to the police does not fall into the category of an anonymous tip. 700 So.2d at 59 (citing State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). In this case the witness's identity was readily discoverable. The witness's continued presence afforded the detective ample opportunity to obtain his identification, an aspect which distinguishes this case from Woodson. Finally, this court in Aguilar stated that if an unidentified witness offers information to a law enforcement officer as a citizen informant, then the information given to the detective is at the high end of the reliability scale. A citizen informant is normally motivated by the desire to further justice, not by pecuniary gain. As such, a citizen-informant is more reliable than the informant who may be involved with the criminals on which he informs. 700 So.2d at 59 (citing Evans, 692 So.2d 216). The witness in this case qualifies as a citizen informant." Milbin v. State, 792 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

(32) The driver of vehicle telling a deputy that a bottle had been tossed out of a certain vehicle’s window was not a citizen-informant where the deputy did not get the driver’s name or license tag number and the anonymous driver left. Solino v. State, 763 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

(33) "The State of Florida appeals an order dismissing a resisting arrest without violence charge and suppressing evidence obtained from an investigatory stop of appellee based upon information provided to the police by a convenience store clerk. Citing Maynard v. State, 742 So.2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the trial court concluded that the information was unreliable and should have been corroborated by the police before stopping and detaining appellee. We reverse, because the store clerk qualified as a citizen-informant, whose information maintained its presumption of reliability and needed no corroboration to establish reasonable suspicion." State v. Manuel, 796 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

(34) "The issue in this case is whether, based on the attending convenience store clerk's tip, Officer Ho had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop and detain appellee. Whether the police have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect based on information provided by an informant depends upon the credibility of the informant. Maynard, 742 So.2d at 316. A tip by a citizen-informant, as opposed to an anonymous tipster, is entitled to a presumption of reliability and does not require further corroboration to provide the requisite reasonable suspicion for a stop. ... In this case, the tip came from a convenience store clerk, who made the 911 call in the scope of his employment. When Officer Ho arrived at the store, he recognized the clerk because of his extensive prior contact with him. The clerk immediately pointed out appellee as the person he witnessed carrying a gun and trying to sell drugs to store customers. Like the McDonald's manager in Evans, he qualified as a citizen-informant, whose information is ‘at the high end of the tip-reliability scale.’ Id. at 218." The court also found that the record was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of reliability. State v. Manuel, 796 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

(35) It is not error for an officer to rely on a BOLO that consisted of hearsay, which in all likelihood came from a police officer's interview with the victim. "This robbery victim was not anonymous, was not a paid informer, and gave the police no reason to doubt his veracity. The police are entitled to credit ordinary citizens who fall victim to crime if circumstances give no reason to believe they are fabricating when a person matching an alleged perpetrator's description is found promptly nearby." State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

(36) The police received an anonymous phone call that the defendant would be moving narcotics from a specified location to his home at a different location. The officers knew nothing else about the call. The officers went to the area where the defendant was suppose to start. They saw him enter a car that was driven by a woman, with two children in the back. The car left the area and went to the defendant's residence. The officers, who were in an unmarked van, followed the defendant to his home and pulled in behind his car. The defendant fled behind his home and the officers caught him in his backyard. In the vehicle the officers found a handgun and crack cocaine. A motion to suppress was denied. On appeal that was reversed. The stop in this case was the act of detaining the defendant in his backyard. The officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the detention. An anonymous tip requires "detailed and specific information corroborated by police investigation." It often requires personal observations to establish the required reliability. In this case the only corroboration of the tip was that the defendant fit the description and was in the designated area. There was nothing else observed by the officers to indicate that the defendant had committed a crime. Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

(37) Police received information from a CI that someone had a large amount of rock cocaine. The CI gave the location, the description and name of the person. The CI did not mention anyone else. After the tip, the officers saw the person who was mentioned in the area, which was known for the sale of cocaine. The defendant was seen ten feet away from that person; however, there was no evidence that he knew the suspected drug dealer. As officers approached, one officer saw the defendant put his hands in his pocket and step back. The officer grabbed the defendant's hand and patted down his pockets. The officer testified that he was afraid the defendant had a weapon. The officer felt a package about the size of a tic-tac container that sounded like it contained rock cocaine. There was no testimony that the officer saw a bulge in the defendant's pocket or that he asked the defendant to show his hands. On appeal the court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress "because there was no evidence that [the defendant] had committed, was committing or was about to commit a crime." J.B. v. State, 679 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

(38) An officer was dispatched to an area as a result of a complaint that there were six black males at an apartment complex selling drugs. When the officer arrived at the scene, he did not see anyone selling drugs. He saw two black males, the defendants, 50 to 100 yards away, walking toward the apartment complex. The officer approached the men and asked them to stop. They walked away and the officer detained them and drugs were found on the person of the defendants. A motion to suppress was denied. On appeal the court reversed. "A tip that six black males are selling drugs late at night at one spot - even in a 'high crime area' - does not describe two black males at a different location. Our supreme court recently addressed the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis in State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 1995). In Butler, the informant's tip 'provid[ed] an abundance of overall detail,' including the defendant's height, race, type of clothing, location, type of drugs sold, location of drugs on the person and method of delivery. Id. at 1130-31. Aside from race and gender, the informant's tip here was devoid of any description other than number and location. Neither of these details was corroborated." In Butler the Court held that "'a tip from an informant, standing alone, will not justify a finding of probable cause for an arrest or search.'" In this case the tip was at material variance with what the officer observed. Pritchett v. State, 677 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

(39) The police department received an anonymous tip that the driver of a maroon Ford was "possibly intoxicated and driving from house to house." Within five minutes an officer spotted such a vehicle and followed it until it went into a driveway. The officer ordered the defendant out of the vehicle. The officer admitted that he had not seen anything suspicious or criminal which would justify the stop of the defendant. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court reversed. "[U]nlike information from citizen informants which is presumed reliable, see State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), information provided anonymously must first be independently corroborated." There was nothing corroborating the information and the officer observed nothing that indicated the driver was impaired. "[T]he information provided in the anonymous tip was no more descriptive than that which ‘could have been provided by any pilgrim on the highway.’" Williams v. State, 721 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

(40) An officer received an anonymous tip indicating that a white male with dark hair and beard was smoking illegal drugs in a tan Ford sedan located in the parking lot of the Majestic Oaks Apartment complex. The officer arrived at the apartment complex in about one minute and noticed a person and vehicle fitting the description leaving the parking lot. The vehicle pulled away using his overdrive or passing gear. The officer stopped the defendant. While the officer was talking to the defendant a second officer arrived with a canine unit. The officer asked the defendant if he had narcotics in the car. The defendant said he did and gave the unlawful substance to the officer. In denying a motion to suppress, the trial judge ruled that the traffic stop was justified because the defendant used his overdrive or passing gear. On appeal the court reversed because the officer testified that the only reason for the stop was the anonymous tip. "This case is similar to that of Williams v. State, 721 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), where a Gainesville police officer stopped a driver based on an anonymous tip that the driver was possibly intoxicated and driving from house to house. The court stated that an anonymous tip may provide reasonable suspicion to justify a stop, however, unlike information provided by citizen informants which is presumed to be reliable, information provided anonymously must be corroborated independently." Morse v. State, 730 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

(41) During a consensual encounter with several men, officers developed reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. "[T]he group of men were only two or three blocks from the shooting incident, they were in the direction where the suspects were seen running, they were encountered within an hour or so of the shooting and the BOLO came from law enforcement officers. The description of a suspect ... fit Bailey." Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

(42) The defendant was sitting on a curb alone. A deputy received a tip that a black male in his forties, wearing burgundy pants and a white shirt was selling drugs at a certain address. The defendant matched the description and was sitting on the curb alone at the location whittling with a knife. Based on J.L. v. State, 727 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1998), the court ruled that this information was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Johnson v. State, 741 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

(43) In this case a known confidential informant provided information. The informant had provided information two to four times in the past. The officer had not been able to verify the informant's past information; therefore, the informant's reliability had not been established. The trial judge treated the tip as if it were anonymous and applied those standards. On appeal the court reversed. "The case law ... draws a distinction between a true anonymous tip and the situation in which there is a specific confidential informant whose reliability has not been determined." The standards for reliance on a known informant of unknown reliability to justify an investigatory stop are lower than for reliance on an unknown informant. "'[A]n informant who has previously furnished the authorities information presumably knows that they know who he is, and hence is aware he will not have the protection from the consequences of prevarication that anonymity would afford." State v. Miranda, 701 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

(44) An officer received an anonymous tip that a person was doing transactions with vehicles. The officer investigated, but did not actually see any criminal conduct or anything indicating that the defendant had a weapon. The defendant was unable to explain his presence at the location to the satisfaction of the officer. The officer assumed that the defendant might be armed. Thus, he searched the defendant and found cocaine. On appeal the court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress. "The lack of independent evidence of criminal activity is fatal to the legality of this search." Fabian v. State, 710 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

(45) One officer (Officer A) had knowledge that the defendant was involved in a pending deportation proceeding, was always armed, and had been previously apprehended by INS. That officer asked another officer (Officer B) to stop the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger. After stopping the car, Officer B patted the defendant down. Officer A was standing next to Officer B during the pat down. Officer B discovered a gun. Officer B said that he patted the defendant down for officer safety, but that he had no idea who the defendant was or whether or not he was armed. "Not knowing these things he had to assume the worst, so he patted [the defendant] down." The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court affirmed. An INS agent had the right to question aliens about their immigration status. "In order to justify a seizure, however, the agent must articulate objective facts providing a reasonable suspicion that the subject of the seizure was an alien illegally in this country." Here the INS agent (Officer A) had sufficient facts to establish reasonable suspicion. He testified that he knew that "Smith was previously apprehended by INS, was involved in a pending deportation proceeding, and was known to be always armed." While Officer B had none of this information, he had the authority to detain the defendant pursuant to the "fellow officer" rule. Which allows an officer to presume that his or her fellow officers who tell him to make a stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion. "It is enough that the police officer initiating the chain of communication either had first-hand knowledge or received information from some person, usually the victim, official source, or eye witness, who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth. See Salas v. State, 246 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). The "fellow officer" rule is applicable whether the communication is from a superior, a fellow officer with the same police department, between different agencies or agencies at different levels within a state, between officials in different states, and between federal and state or local authorities." Smith v. State, 719 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

(46) A confidential informant of unproven reliability provided information that led to the detention of the defendant, the discovery of evidence, and arrest. The trial judge granted a motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed. "A distinction is drawn between a true anonymous tip and the situation where there is a specific confidential informant whose reliability has not been determined. State v. Miranda, 701 So.2d 424, 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Clearly, when an informant comes forward personally to give information that is immediately verifiable at the scene, that information is more reliable than any received via an anonymous phone tip. Miranda, 701 So.2d at 425. Although an unverified tip from an untested informant may be insufficient to justify an arrest or a search warrant, if the tip itself carries sufficient indicia of reliability, it may justify an investigatory stop. Miranda, 701 So.2d at 425; State v. Evans, 620 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In the instant case, the police officers received a tip from an untested confidential informant. However, the informant came forward personally to give the information, the information was immediately verifiable at the scene, and the informant remained with the sergeant throughout the operation. The informant's tip included a general description of the defendant, his house, and his car. These descriptions were accurate. Further, the information obtained by the sergeant from listening to the confidential informant's conversation with the defendant matched the events that occurred. Those included the time the defendant returned to his house, the fact that he arrived with patio furniture that he had apparently just purchased, and the fact that the defendant drove towards the gas station. Moreover, the defendant's behavior in entering the house, remaining about ten minutes, then exiting the house, getting into the car, placing something in the backseat, and driving towards the gas station was consistent with information relayed by the informant to the sergeant wherein the defendant indicated that he would get the cocaine from his house and take it to the gas station. On this basis, we conclude that the confidential informant's tip carried sufficient indicia of reliability to create a founded suspicion on the part of the police officers to justify an investigatory stop." State v. Gill, 780 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

(47) The trial judge denied the motion suppress. "The C.I. in this case had never been used by the investigating officers before. He was arrested earlier on the day of these events and, after giving information concerning his drug supplier, was released. By arrangement with the officers, the C.I. used a pay phone to call a pager number that he said belonged to his supplier. The call was returned, and the C.I. stated to the officers that a man named Rolo would arrive at an agreed location to sell him drugs in about fifteen minutes. Neither the pager number nor the call-back number was obtained by the officers. The C.I. told the officers where Rolo lived, that he would be driving a maroon Buick with a tan top, and there would be drugs under the seat on the driver's side of the car. The officers set up surveillance outside Miller's apartment. The officers already had information about Miller, knew he was known as Rolo on the street, and knew where his apartment was located. Approximately fifteen minutes after the phone call, Miller and another man left the apartment and drove away in a maroon Buick with a tan top. However, they did not go to the expected meeting point; instead, they went to pick up lunch at a restaurant. Miller then drove toward the described meeting place but was stopped approximately one and one half blocks away. The meeting place, the restaurant where Miller picked up lunch, and his apartment complex were all within a one-mile radius. Miller was immediately ordered out of the car and searched. He did not consent to the search of his person or the automobile. Drugs were found on his person and under the driver's seat. In Everette v. State, 736 So.2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), this court held: ‘.... [T]he court must measure the confidential informant's veracity as well as the basis of the C.I.'s knowledge. Veracity can be established by proof that the C.I. has provided reliable information in the past or has provided detailed and verifiable information on the occasion in question.’ 736 So.2d at 727. The information given by the C.I. was not sufficiently reliable so as to provide the officers with the reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry stop nor the probable cause required to search Miller or his vehicle. See Dozier v. State, 766 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)." Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 200).

(48) A reliable confidential informant gave officers information that the defendant was going to purchase cocaine. The informant described where the defendant would be traveling, who he would be with, and the car that he would be in. The officers observed these details and detained the defendant and discovered cocaine. The defendant moved to suppress the cocaine. "The trial court concluded that the informant in this case was a reliable confidential informant, and the search of appellee was consensual. However, the trial court suppressed the cocaine because the informant's information related to a future act and did not show that appellee actually had purchased cocaine. We disagree. Although the informant did not state that appellee was in actual possession of cocaine, the informant's information showed that appellee planned to attempt to purchase cocaine and was likely to have cocaine in his possession in the immediate future. The attempted purchase of cocaine is itself a crime. Under these circumstances, we do not believe it was necessary for the informant to have observed appellee in actual possession of the cocaine.... In this case, the informant was a known confidential informant who had provided reliable information on approximately eight occasions in the past. The officers confirmed several details of the informant's tip. Although the details that were confirmed were innocent in nature, ‘[a]n informant's predictions of future innocent behavior can sometimes authorize the police to stop and search a car.’ Clifford v. State, 750 So.2d 92, 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The only detail that the officers failed to confirm was that appellee actually purchased drugs in North Greenwood. We, however, conclude that given the details that were confirmed, the reliability of the informant, and the officer's prior knowledge of appellee, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. (citation omitted) Furthermore, once appellee was legally stopped, he consented to the personal search and the search of his vehicle. Since consent to the search was given, probable cause was not necessary. (citation omitted)." State v. Hillman, 780 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

(49) "Anonymous telephone tip stating that three black males would get into a particular automobile at a specific address, for purpose of committing armed home invasion robbery, uncorroborated by other information or officers' independent observation of suspicious circumstances, provided insufficient information to justify investigative stop of automobile in question; call referenced only innocent details, and provided no predictive information, such as time or place of planned robbery, leaving police unable independently to corroborate any proposed criminal activity giving rise to probable cause for investigative stop." This is the head note from the opinion. It is a long opinion. The user should read it in its entirety. State v. Kelly, 790 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

(50) "Considering the totality of the circumstances, probable cause was established for Marsdin's detention and the seizure of the bag. Although an anonymous tip, without more, is generally insufficient to demonstrate the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), an anonymous tip corroborated by independent police work can exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop or probable cause to search. Id. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412. The reliability of such a tip is evaluated, among other considerations, on its degree of specificity, the extent of corroboration of predicted future conduct, and the significance of the informant's predictions. Kimball v. State, 801 So.2d 264, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Here, the anonymous tip, combined with independent police observation, was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to search.". Marsdin v. State, 813 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

d. Use of a vehicle: Moore v. State, 561 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Steele v. State, 561 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Sanchez v. State, 711 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Renda, 553 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Turner v. State, 552 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Sierra v. State, 568 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).  (Back)

(1) Defendant stopped vehicle near trailer where drugs were sold + passenger entered trailer + passenger returned to vehicle in a few minutes. No reasonable suspicion. Powell v. State, 649 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(2) Officers suspected drugs were being sold at a residence + defendant came to the residence and left in his car + several cars had done the same thing. No reasonable suspicion. Tinson v. State, 650 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(3) An officer saw three people walking through a convenience store parking lot. They appeared to be intoxicated. The officer saw them get into two separate cars, at least one of which was already occupied. The other car left the parking lot. Before it left the parking lot, the officer radioed for another officer to stop it. When the other officer saw the car, it had no headlights on and it was dark, but they were turned on after another vehicle signaled. The second officer then stopped the car based on his fellow officer's request. A firearm was observed and the defendant was arrested. The defendant's motion to suppress was denied. On appeal the court reversed. "In order to stop a moving vehicle, an officer must have a founded suspicion of criminal activity or cause to believe that he observed a traffic violation." In this case the officer decided to make the stop before the vehicle even left the parking lot because he thought the three people he saw might be intoxicated. There was no testimony that the car's driver was one of the three people. There was no founded suspicion. Payne v. State, 654 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(4) In assessing the validity of a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO some of the facts to be considered are: (a) the time of the stop since the offense; (b) the distance of the stop from the offense; (c) route of flight; (d) the specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants; (e) the source of the information; (f) anything unusual in the situation. In this case the court found that the BOLO was sufficient to create a founded suspicion justifying the stop of the defendant's vehicle. Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995).

(5) Officers saw the defendant lawfully driving his car, in the middle of the day, in an area that had a reputation for high crime activity. The rear window of the vehicle was completely knocked out. "The state attempted to justify this stop based upon the officers' suspicion that the car was stolen because the window was broken out. However, both officers testified to a rather arbitrary pattern of investigating such cars, dependent upon time and place and what they happened to be doing at the time. Furthermore, a significant percentage of cars stopped in that condition were being driven by their owners, perhaps after having been stolen or vandalized, as was Jackson's. At the least, the officers should have run a computer check on the vehicle before pulling Jackson over." Jackson v. State, 660 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(6) A dispatcher put out a BOLO on a cream colored pick-up with three black males leaving the scene of a robbery. Shortly after the BOLO an officer saw a cream-colored Ford pick-up truck, driven no more than 2 1/2 miles from the robbery. It was driving away from the scene of the robbery. The officer determined that there were three males in the truck - two black and one white, He stopped the vehicle. After the driver and one passenger got out the officer asked where they were going and where they had been. Evidence was observed in plain view and was seized. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court reversed. "As a matter of law, we concluded that the BOLO coupled with the mode, time, and direction of the appellees' travel gave officer Bass a reasonable indication that appellees were the robbers he had been told to be on the lookout for although only two of the three were black, Officer Bass not unreasonably surmised that the BOLO might be in error on that point, events having transpired in the dark of night. Greater specificity would have been desirable, but the officer's observations were sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion. The route of the vehicle was not the only possible route, but it was a predictable one. State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

(7) The officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and was acting furtively based on these observations: (1) at almost 7:00 a.m. the officer observed the defendant's vehicle stopped in the middle of three lanes of traffic; (2) it appeared that the vehicle had engine trouble and the defendant was trying to start it; (3) the defendant's eyes were bloodshot and he had a flushed face, which caused him to appear intoxicated; (4) the defendant appeared nervous; (5) as the officer approached, the defendant threw an object in the back seat of the vehicle. The officer had the right to detain the defendant and to have him exit the vehicle. Mendez v. State, 678 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

(8) "Furthermore, the unrebutted testimony of the testifying officers demonstrated that they had at least a reasonable suspicion, based upon detailed and consistent information from two separate confidential sources and partial corroboration of that information prior to the stop, that the vehicle which fit the description given by the informants and arrived at the surveillance location during the specific time period described by the informants was involved in criminal drug trafficking activity. (citations omitted) A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifies a temporary stop of the vehicle and detention of the driver for a reasonable investigation, including ascertaining the driver's identification. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185 (Fla.1993). When, within a few minutes of the stop, the officer determined that the driver was the suspect described by the informants, and further corroborated the information that the suspect was going to see Oricka Scott in room 317 of the motel, he had probable cause to believe that appellee was delivering cocaine, which justified the search of his vehicle." The court pointed out that there were several possibilities as to what the trial judge intended and remanded for factual findings. State v. Moore, 791 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

(9) "At approximately 2:30 in the morning, of March 17th, 2001, the Sprint store ... was robbed. Based upon the 911 call, a ... (BOLO) was issued for a white male, tall, with a thin build, blond hair, blue eyes, wearing a dark colored shirt, and blue jean shorts. No direction of travel was given, nor was any description of an automobile given. A deputy observed a vehicle coming from the direction of the store. "He shined his flashlight into the vehicle and saw that it was occupied by a white male, wearing a white baseball cap and a dark shirt. Deputy Matuse observed the male to lean back into the seat as if concealing himself" The deputy stopped the vehicle. "Upon approaching the vehicle, he observed that the individual in the vehicle was wearing a pair of blue jean shorts; then he called for back up" Witnesses from the robbery identified the driver as the offender. The trial judge found that the stop was unlawful and granted a motion to suppress. On appeal, the court reversed. "In Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S.Ct. 946, 133 L.Ed.2d 871 (1996), the Florida Supreme Court noted that factors relevant in assessing the legitimacy of a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO included: (1) the length of time and distance from the offense; (2) route of flight; (3) specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants; and (4) the source of the BOLO information. Hunter at 248. The state contends that all of these enumerated factors militate against the ruling of the trial court.... Under the factual circumstances as found in this case, we agree with the state that the motion to suppress should have been denied. (citations omitted) In this case the deputy saw Goebel within minutes of the robbery, driving away from the scene late at night in the only car in the area. Additionally, he appeared to ‘lean back as if concealing himself.’ State v. Goebel, 804 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

e. Other observations of noncriminal activity.  (Back)

(1) For recent supreme court decision on innocent conduct see discussion at the beginning of this section on temporary detentions. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed. 2d 740 (2002).

(2) Nervousness + hesitancy + running from officer while he was talking to another person established reasonable suspicion. State v. Bartee, 568 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

(3) Driver of car passing small tightly rolled cigarette to passenger + passenger smoking cigarette and passing it back to driver + officer's experience was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. State v. Lewis, 570 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

(4) Presence in suspected crack house where warrant is being executed + placing something under buttocks. Reasonable suspicion. State v. Neely, 560 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

(5) Talking with a group + putting hand to mouth upon seeing officer. No reasonable suspicion. Williams v. State, 564 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

(6) Early morning hours + men in a car in the parking lot of an open bar + car motor and lights off + officer thought this was unusual + as the officer exited his vehicle the men looked at him + one man suddenly appeared to be shoving something under the seat. No reasonable suspicion. Gano v. State, 599 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(7) Standing in front of cigarette display putting unidentified objects in pocket. No Reasonable suspicion. Dupont v. State, 561 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

(8) An officer was investigating a report that signs were being shot. He went down a cul-de-sac and saw a vehicle with the motor and lights off. Two people were in the truck. The passenger was moving around. The officers asked them to step out. The passenger was putting her clothes on. The court held that the activity of the defendant may have been imprudent, but such innocuous activity did not create the required reasonable suspicion. Satterfield v. State, 609 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

(9) The defendant began to move his vehicle when the officer ordered him to stop. That was an investigatory stop. The officer "did not observe any illegal drugs or activity at any time before he made the stop. At most, he saw an activity that could have had many innocent interpretations. An individual who has cupped hands in front of his face may be covering a sneeze, smoking a legal cigarette or warming his hands with his breath. Even when appellant exhibited surprise [upon seeing the officer], dropped what he was holding and began to leave the area upon seeing the officer, this provided no additional evidence of illegal activity since the act of fleeing is not sufficient to support a stop." Watson v. State, 636 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

(10) An officer saw a group of men in front of a closed restaurant in the middle of the night. Some were standing and some were lying on the ground. The defendant was in the latter category. The officer did not know the defendant, but he suspected that he might be under 18 years of age and in violation of some unidentified curfew. He asked the defendant how old he was and the defendant said he was 18. The defendant made no movements or took any action which created any suspicion. The officer asked the defendant to stand up and turn around. As the defendant turned around he saw what he suspected were drugs in the defendant's pocket. The defendant was the only one in the group who was questioned. The officer said he feared for his safety because this was in a high crime area and the defendant was on private property. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress based on the fact that the defendant was on private property. On appeal the court reversed. The mere fact that these people were on unposted private property was insufficient to establish a trespass. The crime of trespass would have occurred only when the defendant stayed after being asked to leave. There was no evidence that the officer had been asked by the owners to ask people to leave. Thus, the stop could not be justified on the grounds that there was reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was trespassing. Burgess v. State, 630 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

(11) The fact that the defendant adopted an aggressive attitude towards the officer, causing the officer to fear for his safety did not permit an investigatory stop. "[A] search for weapons presupposes that the stop is valid and that the officer then forms the necessary suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous." Mayhue v. State, 659 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(12) The defendant was in an alley behind a closed business in the dark at 6 a.m.. This was in a commercial district, which had recent burglaries. He was carrying a heavy bag containing squared-off objects which appeared to be appliances. These facts were sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion. State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

(13) Officers were in an area known for drug activity and there had been a number of citizen complaints about people selling crack in the area. Two officers saw the defendant standing alone on the corner. They called out to him. The defendant approached the passenger side of the patrol car. The officer who was on the passenger side asked the defendant to step away from the car so that the officer could exit the car. As the officer pushed on the door to open it, the defendant held the door shut. The officer testified that the defendant was free to respond to him or not until he did that. The defendant then ran from the car and the officers chanced him. When they cornered him, one officer asked him why he had run. The defendant said he had just sold some crack cocaine to somebody. The officers arrested him and seized drugs from him. The act of holding the door closed was "extremely unusual behavior" and it created a founded suspicion. His flight provided additional grounds. The defendant's statement about selling crack provided probable cause. State v. Hamilton., 665 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(14) When officers approached a car parked on the side of the road at 3:00 a.m. they shined a light into the car. One officer had extensive training in narcotics investigation, which included learning about the mannerisms of people under the influence and how to identify narcotics. He observed a substance under the driver's nose. Based on his training he believed it was cocaine. When that officer walked over to the car he noticed the defendant in the back seat with a powdery streak down the left sign of his check. Based on his experience and training, the officer concluded that the substance was cocaine. The officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain the people in the car. State v. Wimbush, 668 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

(15) The defendant was a passenger in a car that had been stopped. He seemed nervous and fidgety. An officer asked him if he had any drugs, knives, guns, or bombs and he immediately reached into his left front pocket. The officer grabbed his hand and felt the exterior of his pocket. On appeal the court found that the officer acted improperly because he did not have reasonable suspicion. T.W.C. v. State, 666 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

(16) The fact that a person is holding cash does not create a reasonable suspicion where the officer did not see an exchange of anything. The fact that the defendant chose to walk away from the officer and avoid a consensual encounter plus the fact that the defendant had money in his hand did not add up to reasonable suspicion. Pritchett v. State, 677 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

(17) An undercover agent was sitting in an unmarked car in a night club parking lot. The defendant approached him and asked for rolling papers "so he could roll a joint." The officer had just overheard the defendant ask two other people for rolling papers. When a marked patrol car rolled into the parking lot, the defendant ran. The undercover officer detained him and did a pat down, which revealed cocaine. The court found that there was reasonable suspicion to justify a temporary detention. Angaran v. State, 681 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

(18) In the early morning hours an officer passed through the parking lot of a motel. There had been earlier robberies and burglaries at the motel, but none that evening. The officer became suspicion when he saw two people in a legally-parked car, with brake lights on and headlights off. The car had a local tag. It did not appear to be a rental vehicle and was an older model. For these reasons, the officers suspected that it did not belong to someone who had rented a room at the motel. The officer watched the car. He saw a head moving up and down in the car. The occupants were fidgeting back and forth, looking down and back up, and down again. He could not tell whether the behavior was consistent with legal or illegal activity. He had seen tourist behave in a similar way. The officer walked within eight feet of the vehicle. He was behind a parked car and could see inside the vehicle. He shined his light inside the car and announced that he was a police officer. The occupants were startled and moved quickly. They appeared to lean forward and put something on the floorboard. The officer had the impression that they were trying to tuck something away, but he couldn't see what it was. The officer ordered the occupants out of the car. One of them dropped a straw on the ground. The officer secured a straw and saw a white powder on it. He shined the light into the car and saw a razor blade and mirror on the floorboard with white powder on it. The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable suspicion. Based on Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1993), Harrelson v. State, 662 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Horton v. State, 660 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the court rejected that position and reversed. Bowen v. State, 685 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

(19) The defendant began to move his vehicle when the officer ordered him to stop. That was an investigatory stop. The officer "did not observe any illegal drugs or activity at any time before he made the stop. At most, he saw an activity that could have had many innocent interpretations. An individual who has cupped hands in front of his face may be covering a sneeze, smoking a legal cigarette or warming his hands with his breath. Even when appellant exhibited surprise [upon seeing the officer], dropped what he was holding and began to leave the area upon seeing the officer, this provided no additional evidence of illegal activity since the act of fleeing is not sufficient to support a stop." Watson v. State, 636 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). [Note Wardlow effectively overrules this case as to fleeing.]

(20) Officer had reasonable suspicion for stop where the defendant was observed pushing a lawn mower through a residential area at 11:00 p.m. State v. Williams, 627 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

(21) Officers stopped the defendant for questioning, did a patdown, and discovered marijuana. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed. "Sergeant Matthews testified that his suspicion was aroused only by the fact that appellant was riding his bicycle in a residential area at 1:37 a.m. There was no evidence that appellant was committing any traffic infractions or curfew violations or that he was suspected of any criminal activity. As the sole basis for the stop was the officer's generalized view that it was unusual ‘to see anybody on a bicycle that time of night,’ the officer lacked a founded suspicion for the stop. Because the stop was unlawful, the marijuana and drug paraphernalia seized by the officer should have been suppressed. (citation omitted)." The opinion gives examples where such stops have been ruled valid, but in those case the defendant was carrying a suspicious object. G.A.M. v. State, 780 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

(22) A burglary had been committed. The defendant was an African-American man in a predominately white neighbor. An officer stopped him and discovered evidence from the burglary. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal, the court reversed. "When determining whether a reasonable and well- founded suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop, the totality of the circumstances must be examined. Saturnino-Boudet, 682 So.2d at 191. The State relies on the fact that the defendant was seen walking down a street which was approximately 1 1/2 to 2 blocks away from the burglarized home and that the defendant's clothing was torn and had grass stains. These facts alone are not sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. Although the police officer's hunch was correct, ‘[a] 'hunch' that criminal activity may be occurring is not sufficient.’ (citations omitted)" In a footnote the court also noted that the officers did not notice the defendant’s clothing until after the stop; therefore, the state could not rely on those observations in establishing reasonable suspicion. "[T]he defendant contends, and we agree, that the record indicates that the defendant was stopped because he was a black man walking in a predominately white neighborhood. Officer Little's testimony indicated that he became suspicious only after he learned that Officer Campbell was detaining a black man. Clearly, the fact that a black person is merely walking in a predominately white neighborhood does not indicate that he has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Racial incongruity, a person being allegedly ‘out of place’ in a particular area, cannot constitute a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. (citations omitted)." Phillips v. State, 781 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

(23) "This case arose when a county deputy observed a vehicle, in which Appellants and two other young men were parked in a rural area in Washington County on the shoulder of a road about 20 feet from the pavement. The deputy approached Appellant's vehicle and asked if everything was O.K. The officer was told that the air in the tires of the vehicle was being checked. Neither of the four young men possessed an air gauge. The deputy next asked Appellants where they were from, and where they were going. On being told Panama City, Florida; and Fountain, Florida, respectively, the deputy opined Appellants might be lost, and Appellants agreed they were lost. In response, the deputy gave Appellants directions to Fountain by paved roads, and the deputy proceeded on. As the deputy left, he observed the vehicle tag and called it in to dispatch, which informed him the vehicle was owned by a person 72 years of age who lived in Washington County, and was not reported as stolen. The deputy then turned, pursued, and stopped the vehicle that resulted in the charges against Appellants." The vehicle was owned by the driver’s grandfather and her had permission to use it. "In the instant case, the threshold facts required for an investigatory stop do not exist. The deputy, the sole witness for the State, testified that when he first rode away from such vehicle he had no suspicion of criminal activity. Only after hearing from the dispatcher that such vehicle was not reported as stolen and its owner was 72 years old, did the deputy turn and stop Appellants because, as he testified: ‘Suspicion of criminal activity? No sir. It just didn't sound right; their story didn't jive, so to speak.’, ‘It seemed suspicious to me that I had four young men in a vehicle owned by a seventy-two year old man,’ and ‘I was curious to know whose car it was and who the driver was, based on the possibility it may be stolen and just hadn't been reported yet.’ [Emphasis added]. Thus, given the testimony of the deputy, it is clear the facts are insufficient to support a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity that justifies an investigatory stop of Appellants. See Graham v. State, 714 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The trial court reversibly erred by determining to the contrary and denying Appellants' motion to suppress." Spikes v. State, 781 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

(24) "At the hearing on the motion to suppress the officer, who had classroom training on this subject and professional experience with drivers who consume alcohol, testified: [B]ased on my experience if I see someone operating a vehicle and drinking from a paper bag the first, one of the first things that comes to my mind is that that's the way alcohol is concealed, is sold in, I would say nine out of ten times, it's sold in the store and it's concealed in a paper bag and that's usually how someone operating a vehicle would carry alcohol if they're drinking it." Based on these observations the officer detained the defendant. The defendant argued that the bottle in the bag could have reasonably contained water or other nonalcoholic beverages. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that the fact that the bottle could have reasonably contained some other substance was not the test for reasonable suspicion and the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Dixon v. State, 785 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

(25) "The officer does not have to actually observe a crime being committed. Reasonable suspicion can exist even though the suspicious activity is consistent with innocent activity. The United States Supreme Court has said: "‘"[I]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable cause," and that "[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts." That principle applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion inquiry.’ United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citation omitted). Applying those principles here, the officer observed a white van properly parked in the apartment complex parking lot. It was 3:00 a.m. Backed up to the white van was a red van which had not been parked for the night. It was protruding into the driving area. The back doors of both vans were open. At three o'clock in the morning an officer could reasonably suspect that the white van was being burglarized, with the contents being transferred into the red van. This type of activity and parking arrangement might be unremarkable in the daytime, but they are unusual at 3:00 a.m. These facts added up to a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop." Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

f. Furtive movement: Dees v. State, 564 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).   (Back)

(1) "‘Suspicious or furtive movements are not reasonable grounds to justify a stop and detention, even when combined with flight in a high crime area.’" Breedlove v. State, 605 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

(2) Sitting in a parked truck at dusk + wooded area known for illegal dumping + making a furtive movement when officer approached. No reasonable suspicion. "A quick movement as if to conceal something is a legally insufficient reason to justify a stop." Brown v. State, 687 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

(3) Officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and to grab the defendant’s hand where during a consensual encounter the defendant reached into the front of his pant, underneath his waist band, and turned away from his officer. "Reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts on which to base the officer’s investigative stop. In the present case, the officer had prior personal contacts with Brown and knew that Brown had been arrested for battery on a law enforcement officer. When Brown first ran up to the car, the officer considered his movements threatening. More threatening was his sudden movement putting his hands into his pants and turning away from the officer. Based upon the officer’s general experience and specific knowledge of this particular individual, the trial court did not err in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to seize Brown." Brown v. State, 714 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

g. Use of a profile: United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990); State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990). Established these principles: (l) a profile may be the basis for a lawful detention if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the elements of the profile constitute articulable facts sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) the detention cannot be based solely on nondistinguishing personal physical characteristics which describe a class of people, such as age, race, ethnicity, religious background or sex, rather than specific conduct of a particular individual.   (Back)

(1) A deputy was looking for indications of stolen cars. The deputy was skilled in identifying stolen vehicles and relied on a profile that the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger fit. These were the factors: (1) the car was a General Motors product, which the deputy believed car thieves preferred; (2) it was a Cadillac, which has a high value in chop shops; (3) it had a temporary tag; (4) as the driver was going through a toll booth at 11 p.m., he avoided eye contact with the deputy and seemed nervous. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress. On appeal the court reversed. There is nothing wrong with using a profile as long as "'it reasonably describes behavior likely to indicate crime.... However, Florida law does not permit a profile based on factors that are little more than mundane or unremarkable descriptions of everyday law abiding activities.' State v. Johnson, 561 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1990)." The factors relied on by the deputy were mundane and unremarkable. Clark v. State, 677 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

(2) The defendant also claimed that the stop was based on racial profiling. "[A]s the United States Supreme Court has recognized, ‘the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.’ Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that ‘the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.’ Id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (‘The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.’). As noted by the trial court, however, Glock, who was the driver of the vehicle, was Caucasian. Therefore, even assuming that an official policy of racial profiling existed in New Jersey as of 1983, it is mere speculation that the stop in this case was connected to such a policy; that is, that the stop was based on race or other invidious classification. (citation omitted) To the extent that Glock claims that his vehicle was stopped because he and Puiatti fit a drug profile, a law enforcement officer's reliance on a ‘drug courier profile’ would not be material to the arrest of a suspect that was otherwise reasonable and supported by probable cause. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). A claim of the use of an impermissible profile, not based on race or other invidious classification, would thus relate to the Fourth Amendment claim of whether the original stop was lawful. In this case, nothing that Glock has asserted casts doubt on the legality of the stop so as to allow a collateral attack on the conviction seventeen years after the stop took place." Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2001).